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Introduction
In walking, loitering, performing, taking photos and in a number of  other ways individualsinhabit the public spaces which make up the shared physical environment of  the city. In
inhabiting these public spaces individuals encounter a variety of  copyright-protected works
– for example, public sculptures, murals, images and text on advertising billboards, street
art. Yet, even though individuals have little choice but to encounter these works, copyright
law does not offer a means of  (legally) interacting with them. This results in widespread, if
unconscious, infringement of  copyright law via the flouting of  the relevant legal rules, even
as this flouting enables inhabitants to make a vital contribution to the development of
culture within the intellectual commons. That such infringement occurs has come to
broader attention recently in the calls made for the adoption of  a ‘right of  panorama’ at the
EU level.1
The analysis presented here is situated, in broad terms, within the literature on the
‘right to the city’.2 That literature has, for academic lawyers at least, focused upon the laws
of  real property, planning, protest and the like,3 with intellectual property law largely
absent from discussions of  the regulation of  public spaces. This article seeks to bring the
right to the city into the domain of  intellectual property law, specifically copyright law. It
explores the ramifications of  viewing, reproducing and disseminating publicly placed
works by focusing on s 62 of  the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) and
its historical antecedents, which provide defences to copyright infringement for certain
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works permanently situated in public places. The article argues that, while copyright law
ought to have a public placement exception to infringement, s 62 fails to safeguard the
promotion and dissemination of  creativity in public places and thus harms copyright law’s
purported aim of  promoting creativity and culture. In order to fulfil that aim, the relevant
copyright exceptions ought to focus not on simply balancing the interests of  the author
of  a work and its user, but instead should operate in a manner reflective of  the space in
which the work at issue is encountered. Thus, for example, the wholesale reproduction of
a sculpture in a park would be defensible while the same reproduction of  that sculpture
in the artist’s studio (without permission) would not be. The difference is that the public
is compelled to encounter the former, in that those who enter that park have no choice
but to view it, and so lawful interaction should be less restricted in such a location.
The discussion below addresses, first, the nature of  publicly placed art and the way in
which the inhabitance of  a city makes interaction with certain works unavoidable; second,
whether interactions with publicly placed works constitute copyright infringements; third,
the historical evolution and operation of  s 62 CDPA and whether the fair dealing for
quotation exception – as a proxy for fair use – might be useful in its stead. In concluding,
the paper considers the (potential) implications of  attempting to make copyright rules
consistent with the right to the city.
1 Art in public
This part addresses the relationship between creativity and space by focusing on artistic
works. It offers a definition of  publicly placed artistic works before seeking to address
some of  the issues arising from the public placement of  works. The next section
discusses inhabitants’ experience of  creativity in the city by focusing on artistic works,
rather than other types of  authorial works, which also form part of  the fabric of  the city’s
public spaces, meaning that inhabitants are compelled to experience these works.4
DEFINING PUBLICLY PLACED WORKS
In considering what works are publicly placed (a category which overlaps but is broader
than the category of  ‘public art’),5 we are concerned with those works with which
inhabitance of  public spaces might bring us into contact and which we are, by virtue of
that inhabitance, compelled to view. When we speak of  publicly placed works, do we
include only the obvious types of  works such as commissioned sculptures gracing a town
square or public garden? Is a permanent collection in an art gallery a collection of  public
art? And, to give a specific example, is a sculpture in the Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall6
publicly placed? What about the same sculpture in a shopping mall? There is also a less
obvious but no less public, and vitally important, form of  publicly placed art gracing the
street-facing walls of  buildings – street art, graffiti-writing and the like – which the city’s
inhabitants also experience. Primarily, this article is concerned with interactions with
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artistic works of  a kind that track the existing definition of  the artistic work in the CDPA
to include sculptures, paintings and works of  architecture.7 It is the determination of  the
placement of  these works as public that is liable to cause difficulty, rather than their
categorization as artistic works. This is not to suggest, however, that other artistic works
(such as works of  artistic craftsmanship) and authorial works more generally are irrelevant
to the inhabitance of  a city.
INHABITANCE AND CREATIVITY IN THE CITY
The nature of  the relationship between creativity and the city is not settled in the
literature and, indeed, the meaning of  ‘space’ in the context of  creativity studies can refer
to a number of  categories including location, areas in which creativity is circumscribed by
rules, and environment.8 This is relevant in particular to questions of  how and why
creators produce works and how space both constrains9 such works and shapes the form
that creative outputs take. One example is the way in which the creativity of  architects is
constrained by the need to tailor their work to a particular space and their use of  certain
materials to ensure the building is safe, but also that it meets any relevant legal
standards.10 Certain works, especially works of  architecture, when publicly placed become
objects encountered by others and used to create new works,11 or reproduced and
disseminated by passers-by.
One way to understand the significance of  public placement is to broaden out the
discussion to consider the nature of  creativity within the city, specifically in the context
of  political claims to the right to the city. The phrase ‘right to the city’ tends to be
attributed to Lefebvre who conceived of  the right to the city as part of  various ‘rights’
including also a ‘right to information’ both of  which arise from collective political
struggles and demands.12 It is not a legal right in the vein of  a human right.13 Rather, the
right to the city is described as:
[T]he right to claim presence in the city, to wrest the use of  the city from
privileged new masters and democratize its spaces.14
Central to the political struggle, and indeed the concept of  a right to the city, is the notion
of  inhabitance.15 Inhabitance is an aspect of  the ‘lived experience’ of  a space.16 For
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Lefebvre, ‘urban inhabitance’ trumps nationality/citizenship as the primary identification
of  a political community and so it is inhabitance and not citizenship that gives rise to the
right to participate in decision-making that affects urban space.17 In contrast, this article
adopts Lefebvre’s concept of  inhabitance purely in relation to movement through space
(whether walking or in a wheelchair, on a bicycle, in a car, a train etc.) although such a leap
might, for good reason, horrify geographers.18 A question for this article is what
inhabitance means in the context of  photography (or other reproduction) of  works
located in public space.
Specifically, this part, and indeed the subsequent parts dealing with copyright
infringement of  publicly placed works (and defences to claims of  infringement), are
concerned with exploring the material point of  access to copyright-protected work in public
space.19 Access to works in public space (the physical commons) acts as a point of  access
to the work in intellectual space (the intellectual commons) or, put another way, provides
a co-existent physical location for a work within the intellectual commons that – once the
physical object ceases to exist – may continue its life purely within intellectual space.20 We
are thus primarily concerned with the potential to reproduce works, rather than the
creation of  new works such as stencils or tags, in the physical commons.21 This
conception of  inhabitance is thus relevant for our purposes because of  the emphasis
placed on participation in, and appropriation of, space,22 the former of  which includes
the right of  inhabitants to play23 while moving through the city.
In developing the notion of  inhabitance, let us consider here the practical ways in
which the free circulation of  people within and through public spaces facilitates access to
and interaction with creative works and the way this is hampered by copyright. We might
link this notion of  inhabitance specifically to the idea of  the flâneur,24 the aimless
wanderer of  the city. As de Certeau puts it in The Practice of  Everyday Life, ‘the street
geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers’25 – that
is, a space comes to exist only once it is inhabited. The claim to free, reasonably
unencumbered movement through space is a political claim to the city and, specifically, a
form of  resistance to real property, planning and other laws26 that inhibit movement and
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action in public spaces in particular.27 But such a right to freedom of  movement within
public space is difficult to protect where the would-be flâneur’s desires conflict with those
of  the owners of  private property, or perhaps overzealous regulation by public
authorities. As Layard points out:
[F]or activities for which there is no recognized and protected right (the abilities,
for example, to play, to picnic, to take photographs, ride a bike or simply to be
an urban flâneur), no requirement of  proportionality is imposed upon the
landowner.28
There is also no, or certainly an insufficient, requirement for proportionality in preventing
or inhibiting such movement placed on the owner of  copyright in publicly placed works.
Given the multitude of  ordinary ways in which the inhabitance of  a city is manifested
through photography and the sharing of  photographs (the tourist taking a photograph is an
obvious but not a special example of  such interaction, the posting of  selfies on social media
is another),29 it is these ordinary ways of  inhabiting the city and, in particular, navigating its
public spaces – by, for example, moving and recording experience – that matter.
Burrowing further into the notion of  inhabitants’ movement through the city, it is
worth considering such movement in more detail. Again we might make use of  Lefebvre’s
work, this time on the concept of  rhythm. While acknowledging that rhythm may have a
special relevance to ‘established sectors of  knowledge and creation’,30 our concern is with
Lefebvre’s exploration of  the rhythm of  ordinary life in the city. While the former seems
the obvious – and no doubt a fruitful – starting point for intellectual property scholars, it
is the latter that is of  interest in discussing publicly placed works. Specifically, we are
concerned with the ‘rhythm’ of  walking as a confluence of  place, time and energy;31 not
a bare physical act but rather ‘a cultural practice that is . . . productive of  culturally
oriented experiences’.32 The rhythms of  walking have been classified to include a number
of  types including the saunter, amble and hike.33 Publicly placed works institute their own
peculiar rhythm on the commuter, ambler, or whichever type of  walker and so we might
add to this the act of  walking while stopping to take photographs. Indeed, the significance
of  the way in which publicly placed works may influence movement ought not to be
restricted to walkers but to encompass the rhythm of  other forms of  movement through
public space (for example, observing trackside graffiti from a train).
A discussion of  forms of  movement brings us back again to the camera. In moving
through space individuals are presented with an environment that lends itself  to
photography. Given the prevalence of  digital cameras in smartphones, every individual in
possession of  a smartphone is potentially a photographer. The specific issue of  interest
to us here is the relationship between the constitution of  public space through movement
Copyright and the right to the city 63
27   Specifically, the right to the city is characterised as a form of  resistance to private property and highlighting,
in contrast, that it is the needs of  inhabitants that must be put first: Layard (n 13) 261.
28   Referring to England: ibid.
29   As an aside, a town in Texas recently unveiled a sculpture of  two women taking a selfie in the square in front
of  city hall: Cady Land, ‘A Selfie Statue has Divided this Texas Town’ Time, 1 June 2016
<http://time.com/4354114/selfie-statue-sugar-land-texas>. It seems perverse that an inhabitant taking a
selfie with a selfie sculpture might be liable for copyright infringement.
30   Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life, Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (trans)
(Bloomsbury Academic 2004) 3. The concept of  rhythm, loosely adopted in this article, is explored in detail
in Rhythmanalysis.
31   Lefebvre in Tim Edensor, ‘Walking in Rhythms: Place, Regulation, Style and the Flow of  Experience’ (2010)
25 Visual Studies, 69–79, 69.
32   Ibid 74.
33   Ibid.
and the reproduction of  the particular space in which an individual finds themselF. For
now it suffices to note that photography, in reproducing a work at the material point at
which it is accessed in public space, is ordinary: it is a ‘tool to register personal
experience’.34 The very act of  registering an experience in this way produces a
‘hybridization . . . between physical and digital experiences’.35 As already alluded to, the
freedom to move in public space and reproduce what is experienced there is relevant not
only to being physically present in any particular place but also in being ‘present’ and
contributing to the development of  culture within intellectual space36 (the intellectual
commons) through digital participation.
Moreover, making images, specifically of  ordinary experiences in the city, is potentially
– whether or not intended as such – a political act; one which allows an individual to
propose or effect an understanding, not only of  the physical space in which they find
themselves, but also their place within the wider environment of  which that particular
public space is one part. This includes being able to record (reproduce) and ascribe
meaning to the objects found there37 (for our purposes, the specific interaction with, and
evaluation of, artistic works) by, for example, communicating new works based on the
viewed objects virtually. The discussion here does not treat the ability to photograph as
an ancillary ‘right’ to the right to the city, but rather as a crucial aspect of  the inhabitance
of  a city and, especially, a city’s public spaces. One would do as well to tell the public not
to walk in public space as not to photograph it. The effect would be much the same.
2 Interaction as copyright infringement
Interactions of  inhabitants with publicly placed works are viewed here through the lens
of  copyright law by focusing on reproduction and communication to the public (other
rights, such as the moral right of  integrity, are also potentially significant to our
exploration of  interactions with publicly placed works, but are not discussed here).38
WALKING ALONG QUEEN STREET
To illustrate some of  the points made in this part, the Wellington statue in Queen Street,
Glasgow, serves as a useful example. The statue was created by Carlo Marochetti in 184439
and placed in front of  the Glasgow Gallery of  Modern Art (GOMA), which was
originally the private residence built in 1778–1780 for a wealthy tobacco merchant,
William Cunninhghame.40 The statue, notwithstanding the talent of  the sculptor, is
famous for the ever-present traffic cone on Wellington’s head that has transformed it into
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a ‘Glaswegian tradition’.41 The identity of  the first person to have placed the cone on the
statue is unknown, but one report suggests it to have been placed there by a student at
some point in the 1980s.42 Recent attempts by Glasgow City Council to remove, and
prevent the replacement of, the cone were met with public outcry, including a petition to
‘save Wellington’s cone’, and the plans were quickly abandoned.43
The aim here is not to make any special claims about the statue itself  or interference
with it, nor indeed to comment on the esteem (or not) in which the inhabitants of  the city
of  Glasgow hold it. In particular, while fun, this is not necessarily the best example of
publicly placed art that might be used here seeing as the Marochetti sculpture itself  is out
of  copyright and therefore already within the public domain of  the intellectual commons.
Rather, the Wellington statue is being used simply to illustrate some of  the arguments
made which will be relevant to other works and other places, and to the inhabitants of
other cities.
AN ORIGINAL WORK
Before considering the ways in which interactions with publicly placed works constitute
copyright infringement, we must, briefly, identify some of  the relevant copyright subject
matter we encounter. In walking down a street, for example, we might encounter a statue
or sculpture (artistic work – sculpture), a mural (artistic work – painting), or a museum
(artistic work – work of  architecture).44 In the context of  walking down Queen Street, we
might – though of  course, the GOMA banners will change depending on the exhibition
being shown – at a particular point come into contact with a number of  potentially
copyright-protected works. Imagine that our vantage point is standing across the street
from GOMA. First, in the foreground there is the Wellington statue, cone in place. This
would qualify as a work of  sculpture and, indeed, an original work of  sculpture.
Having identified the sculpture by Marochetti as out of  copyright, the next question is
whether the sculpture in the form it has taken since the 1980s is an original artistic work.
Assuming our creator is a qualifying person,45 the question, in the UK, is whether the
simple addition of  the cone produces a work of  sufficient ‘skill, labour or judgment’ or,
insofar as the originality requirement has been harmonised at EU level, it is the author’s
‘own intellectual creation’.46 It seems at least arguable that making the creative choice to
place the cone there is enough to make the work original.47 However, the very power of
the cone-ed statue lies in the placement choice – a busy city street and the placing of  a cone
on the statue of  a politically significant figure – but it is not clear that the placement figures
as a creative choice of  the kind recognised by copyright. In other situations – such as the
creation of  a site-specific sculpture – the status of  publicly placed creativity will more
evidently constitute an original artistic work in which copyright subsists.
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Our stroll down Queen Street reveals a number of  other artistic works, including the
graphic work in the form of, what appears to be, a mural below the roof  line of  the
gallery.48 Third, although we are focusing on publicly placed artistic works, we also
encounter a number of  literary works on the banners hung from the gallery including the
text ‘Ripples on the pond’.49 Fourth, there is GOMA itself, also an artistic work, that is a
work of  architecture which is – by reason of  its age – out of  copyright. Finally, were we
outside of  the gallery around December 2015 we would have seen a number of  works
relating to an exhibition held in the gallery at that time. The outside of  the gallery was
adorned by a number of  neon-light sculptures by artist Ross Sinclair, spelling out in
cursive script phrases such as ‘We [heart] the Highland Clearances’ and ‘We [heart]
Failure.’50 These works may be both literary and artistic51 and would on the face of  it
appear to be ‘intellectual creations’. Or, in terms of  UK law, even if  the text itself  is
insufficiently original, there would be an original artistic work here as a sculpture, the
letters being formed in a manner requiring a certain level of  skill and judgement.52
If  we were to walk down Queen Street today our experience would be different again
and this brings us to another relevant point: that recording of  our experience matters in
the sense of  preserving the public space as it was at a particular point in time. In ignoring
copyright law and taking a photograph to reproduce the streetscape, we are thus reacting
to our environment and the works within it. We may, for example, seek to take a photo
to record our visit to Glasgow for a conference or to use a photograph in order to
produce a stencil or screen print or some other creative work. We may simply want to
share the work on social media at a later date. (Certainly it is hard to imagine someone
clearing copyright for #throwbackthursday on Instagram or Twitter.) Walking along
Queen Street then, or indeed any street, we may wish to interact with works while
remaining uncertain of, or oblivious to, their status as copyright-protected works.
REPRODUCTION AND COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC
As indicated in the discussion of  inhabitance in part 1 above, encounters with publicly
placed works may lead us to photograph these works or, perhaps, if  we are of  a more
artistic bent, to sit and sketch out the streetscape in charcoal or pencil or to set up an easel
and paint the scene before us. In this context, the legal regulation – including by copyright
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law – that seeks to restrict such sensory experience matters.53 It does not matter in the
sense that it might not physically prevent us from taking a photograph of  a street art
stencil, but it permeates what we, walking or loitering on the street, see or hear or smell.54
In choosing to take that photograph of  the Wellington statue or some other publicly
placed work, we are (unconsciously) resisting copyright in refusing to abstain from an
infringing act. The relevant infringing act is the reproduction of  the whole or a substantial
part of  the protected work.55
With respect to the reproduction of  works as a form of  resistance to copyright, the
discussion here has an affinity with the work of  Bertoni and Montagnani who argue that
a study of  works of  architecture reveals the fundamental instability of  copyright law.56
This is because such works are public and therefore, besides contests between copyright
owners, real property owners and the public, such works raise the prospect of  a contest
regarding ‘the public interest in preserving architectural heritage and the public interest in
altering cities and urban landscapes’.57 A similar point applies to publicly placed works
more broadly with respect to interactions that seek to leave a material work intact, but to
reproduce it and perhaps alter it.58
It is fairly uncontroversial to note that the internet has had an impact on modes of
political and cultural communication. This brings us to the second form of  infringement
that our interactions with publicly placed works might take and this is – having reproduced
a work – communicating the work to the public59 by sharing it, for example, on social
media, a blog, a newspaper site and the like. This might be seen, for example, in relation to
Glasgow City Council attempts to remove the cone from the Wellington Statue in Queen
Street and the flurry of  comments this generated in newspapers and on social media,
complete with reproductions of  the statue itself. Even before that, a cursory search of
Twitter reveals interaction with the work and a discussion of  viewers’ responses to it. An
inhabitant may, quite reasonably, choose to reproduce and communicate it as a means of
making sense of  both the individual experience of  being in public space as well as
contributing to the development of  culture within the intellectual commons by sharing their
experience via the work’s reproduction, and perhaps by creating a new work based on it.
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53   There are other relevant forms of  regulation that may restrict the experience of  a space. For example,
photography in a public space may be an offence insofar as photography may constitute ‘a record of
information of  a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of  terrorism’ in s 58
Terrorism Act 2000, but the phrasing is broad enough to cover even the most innocuous photography. Specific
prohibitions, with respect to certain sensitive areas such as military installations, can also be found in s 1(1)(c)
Official Secrets Act 1911 regarding the recording of  information that ‘may be useful to an enemy’. The Public
Space Protection Orders in s 59 Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 are framed so broadly that
one might imagine they may potentially prohibit all kinds of  behaviour, including photography in a particular
public place. All of  this is quite apart from rules on the misuse of  private information that may apply.
54   On the regulation of  the senses in the context of  intellectual property law, see Andreas Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, ‘Atmospheres of  Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes’ (2013) 7 Emotion, Space and Society 35–44.
55   CDPA, s 17. 
56   Aura Bertoni and Maria Lillà Montagnani, ‘Public Architectural Art and its Spirits of  Instability’ (2015) 5
Queen Mary Journal of  Intellectual Property 247–63.
57   Ibid 252. See also Aura Bertoni and Maria Lillà Montagnani, ‘Public Art and Copyright Law: How the Public
Nature of  Architecture Changes Copyright Protection’ (2016) 12 Future Anterior 46–55, 48.
58   But note that there would likely be integrity right implications here. On public art and moral rights, see
Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Authors’ Rights in Works of  Public Sculpture: A German/Australian Comparison’ (2002)
32 International Review of  Intellectual Property and Competition Law 164–84.
59   CDPA, s 18. We are not concerned with the virtual public space of  the internet except insofar as works
interacted with in material spaces come to be reproduced and communicated digitally (and this raises a host
of  other issues relating to digital reproductions of  public art), on which see Jennifer Kwong, ‘Photographs of
Public Art in the Digital Environment’ (2014) 36(7) European Intellectual Property Review 428–37.
REPRODUCTION, COMMUNICATION AND THE COMMONS
That communication of  works may be an infringing act is especially problematic given the
way in which social media serves to extend urban spaces. The reproduction and
communication of  publicly placed works may be described as part of  the ‘prolongations
between the material and the immaterial that constitute urban mediations’.60 More
importantly, this mediation does not somehow flow from the material space – in our case,
the publicly placed object – to immaterial space, but in other ways too. New media, here
referring to social media, can also encourage play within the city.61 For example, social
media suggestions may encourage a visit to GOMA or a walk along Queen Street which,
in turn, might lead the walker to take a photograph and share it on Facebook, and so on.
The point is not that the virtual space of  the internet ought to be equated with the
intellectual commons, but rather that a work located in a physical public space and the
same work shared on the internet will in both scenarios be also placed within the
intellectual commons. Access to these works then provides the potential for developing
culture within the intellectual commons. The problem, as identified above regarding
infringement by reproduction, for example, is that copyright does not provide an easy,
lawful means by which to encourage this development. What we need instead is a set of
copyright rules that will take into account the importance of  interacting with publicly
placed works as a precursor to the enrichment of  the intellectual commons.
Bruncevic offers a suggestion as to how such interactions may be approached in
comparing access to the intellectual commons with the (Swedish) ‘right to roam’:
Access to art through a cultural commons is the equivalent of  the hiking,
camping and the picking of  berries in the cultural environment . . . [The] notion
of  ‘environment’ is also what further enables the connection with the natural
commons and allemansrätten to be made even more comfortably. It has to do
with the public’s cultural health and wellbeing . . . [The] approach is both an
economically and democratically sustainable management of  our common
cultural resources.62
An even stronger case might thus be put for enabling interaction with publicly placed
works which are relevant to the management of  both types of  ‘environments’. Indeed,
following Gray63 on the right to roam in the countryside,64 we might usefully take up the
same concept to argue for a form of  ‘pedestrian democracy’ that includes walking, and
photography, in places other than the natural landscape where, more in Scotland than
elsewhere in the UK, rights to wander more freely are granted.65 Such access rights are
important in a broader political sense too: access to property, whether public or private,
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60   Andrea Mubi Brighenti, ‘New Media and Urban Motilities: A Territoriologic Point of  View’ (2012) 49 Urban
Studies 399–414, 403. Note that Brighenti is not discussing photography, but rather theories of  new media
and urban motilities.
61   Referring to Galloway’s work, Andrea Mubi Brighenti, ‘New Media and the Prolongations of  Urban
Environments’ (2010) 16 Convergence: The International Journal of  Research into New Media Technologies
471–87, 484. An example given is of  the ‘Undersound’ project in London. It refers also to Iveson’s work on
the importance of  media to the ‘definition of  the public realm’ at 476.
62   Merima Bruncevic, ‘Fixing the Shadows: Access to Art and the Legal Concept of  Cultural Commons’ (PhD
thesis, University of  Gothenburg 2014) 142.
63   Kevin Gray, ‘Pedestrian Democracy and the Geography of  Hope’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of  Human Rights and
the Environment 45–65.
64   Ibid describing ‘pedestrian democracy’ as ‘the self-determining, self-empowering, self-fulfilling entitlement of
the citizen to walk or climb over natural terrain’ at 45.
65   Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2001, s 1.
is necessary for the exercise of  free expression and association.66 We might add then that,
alongside the necessity for a right to roam in order to access creativity in the intellectual
commons, the right to roam in the city’s public spaces – where works are encountered,
reconfigured and simultaneously given over to the intellectual commons – must also be
encouraged to promote creativity and culture. Such interactions are as necessary as
camping is to the walker roaming the countryside.
Making acts consequent on inhabitance infringing interferes not only (as discussed
above) with the recording of  the individual experience of  the city but also with
communication, in particular as a means of  further enriching culture within the
intellectual commons. Yet, if  claiming a right to the city leads to copyright infringement,
the next question to ask is whether the scope of  copyright exceptions is up to the task of
protecting the types of  interactions that are a necessary part of  inhabiting a space.
3 Exceptions
A number of  defences might be available to an individual who has infringed copyright in
a publicly placed work, including the various fair dealing defences. However, while useful,
these defences also require something to be done for a particular purpose, for example,
research, private study, news reporting.67 The point of  taking inhabitance seriously is that
it makes interaction a part of  being in the city and experiencing public space; it need not
have some defined purpose beyond that. Section 31 CDPA which provides a defence
where the inclusion of  works is purely incidental is also relevant but of  little use given we
are concerned with the reproduction of  publicly placed works in full as part of  recording
the experience of  moving through public space.
Section 62 CDPA is highlighted in this part because it alone directly addresses the
issue of  the public placement of  certain works as an exception to infringement. This part
thus proceeds by considering the (relatively) recent history of  the public placement
exception in the UK, the operation of  s 62 CDPA and the possibility of  using the new
quotation exception to excuse the infringement of  copyright in publicly placed works.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC PLACEMENT EXCEPTION
The antecedents to s 62 CDPA are twentieth-century additions to copyright legislation,
but the inclusion of  a public placement exception must also be viewed in light of  broader
debates over the meaning of  the public interest that developed over the course of  the
nineteenth century.68 In particular, an exception relating to works of  architecture needs
to be understood in the context of  a lack of  copyright protection for works of
architecture altogether prior to the Copyright Act 1911: the question of  a public
placement exception thus simply did not arise in the nineteenth century insofar as
copyright did not subsist in such works. The Royal Commission on Copyright noted –
following vigorous representations from the Institute of  British Architects – that
providing even the modest (to contemporary eyes) 20-year term of  protection sought
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67   CDPA, ss 29, 30, 30A.
68   On which see Isabella Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Hart 2010) ch 7.
Relevant discussion of  the public interest will be found in ch 6, ‘Art, Copyright and the Public Interest’ in
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against reproduction would be ‘impracticable’.69 Indeed, at the time, some Members of
Parliament showed their unease with the extension of  copyright protection to
architecture.70 Sculpture, of  course, had already been the subject of  its own statute for
some time before this discussion under the Sculpture Copyright Act 1814 and, before
that, in a more limited fashion under the Models and Busts Act 1798.
This article does not consider the meaning of  the public interest, but the
consideration of  what the public interest is and how it might be served, though the
defences to copyright infringement is plainly relevant to the public placement exception
and the public placement of  works more generally. This is made clear in the House of
Lords debate over the inclusion of  the exception in the 1911 Act in which the ‘public
interest’ is cited in response to criticism that sculptors would be disadvantaged by the new
exception.71 Hansard shows Viscount Haldane observing: ‘[I] think it would be going a
great deal too far to take away from the public the right which they now have to sketch,
for instance, a statue in Trafalgar Square.’72
Yet such an exception, it was suggested, ought to be limited and, indeed, was less
broad than it might have at first appeared. Two points of  particular relevance arise from
the debate relating to place and exploitation. First, the limitation centred on the meaning
of  a public place:
To-day you may make a sketch of  a statue or public building as freely as you
please. The Bill does give protection, and the only question is what are the
restrictions which are necessary in the public interest. We have drawn the line at
buildings and public places, subject to the qualification which I am prepared to
accept as to places kept up mainly or in part by public funds.73
What we see here, and in the above reference to Trafalgar Square, is a concern with where
a work is situated and, consequently, how members of  the public in that space experience
it. We thus also see, at least impliedly, a broader concern with how individuals already
inhabit the public spaces of  the city.
Second, the issue of  commercial exploitation is raised by the Earl of  Plymouth and
worth quoting at length:
If  under certain circumstances reproductions by photograph or in other ways are
made of  large sculptural monuments in public places, and if  large profits are
made by those who take advantage of  the new processes of  reproduction, is it
not fair to consider whether sculptors ought to be placed in this position, that the
work of  their brains is to be turned into money by other people, and that they
should suffer certainly more than other artists who produce their work in a
different manner. I do not wish to suggest that it is easy to frame a Bill which is
perfectly fair to everyone, but I do think my noble friend has raised a serious
point, and that it is, not quite fair to imagine that those representing the great art
of  sculpture in stone, marble, and bronze can be satisfied to remain in a position
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69   Copyright Commission, The Royal Commissions and the Report of  the Commissioners (1897) xxii. The document
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70   Alexander (n 68) 274.
71   See ibid 285.
72   HL Deb 14 November 1911, vol 10, col 118. Viscount Haldane also observes that prior to the Act there was
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where the work of  their brains can be turned into money by persons who
reproduce their work.74
Immediately then we can see a tension between enabling the movement within public
space and the necessary reproductions and disseminations of  certain works found within
that space that such movement entails. The conflict with an author’s ability to exploit the
work and not to have the work exploited unfairly by others is one that this article returns
to in considering whether a functioning public placement exception ought to be limited
to non-commercial uses. Indeed, the speaker was concerned about an author’s creativity
being ‘turned into money’ at the author’s expense. Viscount Haldane in response to the
above criticism referred to the example of  the Queen Victoria Memorial which had been
reproduced extensively and noted that to prevent such reproductions would not be in the
‘public interest’.75
In the event it was a broad public placement exception that was adopted, with
s 2(1)(iii) Copyright Act 1911 providing that:
The making or publishing of  paintings, drawings, engravings, or photographs of
a work of  sculpture or artistic craftsmanship, if  permanently situate in a public
place or building, or the making or publishing of  paintings, drawings, engravings,
or photographs (which are not in the nature of  architectural drawings or plans)
of  any architectural work of  art.76
What is interesting about this, apart from the failure to exclude underlying drawings and
thus perhaps inadvertently giving the Earl of  Plymouth what he wanted, is that the final
incarnation of  the section was so broadly construed in terms of  the places it covered. An
earlier version of  the clause – that being discussed in the House of  Lords debate, also
considered above – referred instead to ‘a public place or building the maintenance of
which depends wholly or in part on public funds’.
A particular point is also worth highlighting here regarding the relevance of  both
space and the type of  work covered in the adoption of  the 1911 Act exception. A
compelling reason for including only three-dimensional artistic works within the scope of
the exception is that it is only non-competing two-dimensional reproductions that will be
made of  such works.77 Another possible reason is revealed in the minutes of  a House of
Lords Select Committee in which the views of  the Academy78 are discussed, specifically
why paintings are privileged over sculptures, since sculptures in public places may be
reproduced while paintings may not be. Viscount Knutsford observes that the difference
between the two forms of  artistic work has to do with placement. Placement is inherently
relevant to works of  sculpture:
You do not usually exhibit paintings in the open air for everybody to look at,
while sculpture is constantly bought for places where everybody can see it, and it
is placed in public places.79
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The view raises an intriguing question about the ways in which particular notions of  space
are used implicitly to categorise works as holding characteristics besides their inherent
qualities as creative expressions. This concern with the types of  work thus reveals itself
to be at least in part a concern with space.
The subsequent incarnation of  the public placement exception in the Copyright Act
1956 was broadly similar. Section 9(3) provided:
The copyright in a work to which this subsection applies which is permanently
situated in a public place, or in premises open to the public, is not infringed by
the making of  a painting, drawing, engraving or photograph of  the work, or the
inclusion of  the work in a cinematograph film or in a television broadcast. This
subsection applies to sculptures, and to such works of  artistic craftsmanship as
are mentioned in paragraph (c) of  subsection (1) of  section three of  this Act.
Section 9(10) also provided an exception for underlying drawings, though only where
works of  architecture are concerned and only with respect to the reconstruction of  the
building.80
The meaning of  ‘permanently situated’ is similar to that in s 62 CDPA, seeing as it
refers to both a ‘public place’ and ‘premises open to the public’. What is interesting about
this is that it may well have covered places that were privately owned but which gave
permission to the public to enter. Certainly, it would seem to have included public
galleries. The breadth of  the places covered troubled Earl Jowitt who asked during a
debate on the Bill in the House of  Lords:
I am worried about the words ‘permanently’ and ‘making.’ So far as the adverb
‘permanently’ is concerned, the Tate Gallery and all modern galleries try, if
possible, to re-arrange their pictures from time to time. Some of  them go down
to the cellars, and then come up again and see the light of  day. Whether a picture
in those circumstances could be said to be ‘permanently situated in a public
place,’ I am not sure. I suppose a member of  the public can, if  he wishes, say,
‘You have not got this picture on exhibition to-day. May I go down to your cellars
and look at it?’81
A response resolving this point did not appear to be forthcoming, but the interesting
point here is the alertness to what it means for a work to be publicly placed and, albeit
indirectly, noting that such placement would alter individual calculations about the
accessibility of  the work. Given what we have seen in relation to inhabitance, it seems
obvious that the placement of  the work in a public space would lead to an expectation of
being able to freely view, and potentially to interact, with the work.
However, the 1956 version of  the public placement exception omitted what was
parenthesised in the 1911 iteration, namely the exclusion from the scope of  the exception
works ‘which are not in the nature of  architectural drawings or plans’. Having specified
such underlying works, the omission of  a similar reference to underlying works relating
to sculpture and artistic craftsmanship would suggest that the underlying graphic works
were caught by implication in the exception.82 To the extent that underlying works could
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not be said to have even been impliedly covered in the 1956 Act, the public placement
exception was excessively narrow both in failing to account for different types of  artistic
works that individuals view in public spaces (such as murals), as well as in failing to place
underlying works within the scope of  the exception. Yet, arguably, Parliament had
intended to recreate the 1911 exception,83 so this may have been a case of  unfortunate
drafting. Whatever the reason, the latest iteration of  the public placement exception is
little better.
SECTION 62 CDPA
The current public placement exception in the CDPA is found in s 62 and reads:
(1) This section applies to—
(a) buildings, and
(b) sculptures, models for buildings and works of  artistic craftsmanship, if  permanently
situated in a public place or in premises open to the public.
(2) The copyright in such a work is not infringed by—
(a) making a graphic work representing it,
(b) making a photograph or film of  it, or
(c) making a broadcast of  a visual image of  it.
(3) Nor is the copyright infringed by the issue to the public of  copies, or the communication
to the public of  anything whose making was, by virtue of  this section, not an
infringement of  the copyright.84
The section has a number of  flaws. It omits from the scope of  the defence underlying
drawings; it allows commercial publication of  works and, related to this, it is concerned
with three-dimensional works only, thus allowing for greater exploitation of  some works
than others; and the wording of  the section is potentially vague in referring to permanently
situated works.85 These difficulties are exacerbated by the lack of  case law that might
guide our interpretation. There is only one mention of  the section, without the section
being applied, in Shelley Films v Rex Features.86 Without further guidance then as to what
the wording of  s 62 adds up to, it remains an exception whose existence is necessary if
copyright law is to take space seriously as a factor in determining the acceptable use of
works, but which does not fulfil the end it aims at. At the very least, we need to open up
a conversation about how the public interest may be protected when it comes to publicly
placed artistic works.87 In the context of  this article that means supporting inhabitants in
being able to interact with publicly placed works.
First, the failure to include underlying drawings of  sculptures, works of  artistic
craftsmanship and works of  architecture within the ambit of  the exception (explicitly or
by implication) makes it almost certainly ineffective. Burrell and Coleman contrast the
wording of  s 62 with that of  s 65 CDPA regarding the reconstruction of  buildings which
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specifically excludes underlying drawings.88 There appears to have been no discussion of
the inclusion of  s 62 into the 1988 Act during parliamentary debates over its adoption, so
it is difficult to see what, if  any, rationale there was for such an omission or, indeed, for
the exception as a whole. Thus, while it would appear that in walking down the street and
seeking to reproduce and communicate a sculpture that captures our imagination we
might not be infringing the copyright in the sculpture, we may well be infringing copyright
in the author’s sketches or other drawings. Based only on this, s 62 is not only unfit to
vindicate an inhabitant’s claim to the right to the city, but is incapable of  achieving even
the more limited end at which it aims (i.e. to provide a defence to the infringement of
certain categories of  publicly placed artistic work).
Second, s 62 refers to a particular type of  publicly placed work reflecting perhaps
certain assumptions about the sorts of  works that will typically be encountered in public
space – namely sculptures.89 It excludes a variety of  works encountered by inhabitants in
a city’s public spaces, including works of  street art and graffiti. Burrell and Coleman
suggest that the fateful inclusion of  the words ‘such works’ in s 62 – a qualifier that was
not present in the 1911 Act – limits its scope.90 To that extent the slightly broader
wording of  Article 3(h) of  the Infosoc Directive (‘use of  works, such as works of
architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently in public places’)91 is to be
preferred. It potentially leaves open the inclusion of  other forms of  publicly placed
works, putting the emphasis on works located in public rather than works that are
necessarily like sculpture. Nevertheless, in referring to works made for public spaces,
Article 3(h) would seem narrower than s 62 which, while it insists on permanence, does
not insist on a work having been made for the public place (thus also suggesting that s 62
may be incompatible with EU copyright law).
However, such an interpretation is overly hopeful, given the current EU Commission
consultation on the ‘panorama exception’.92 It may be that, in light of  the consultation,
we will see a more sensible EU-wide approach to this issue, but the parameters of  the
consultation – in focusing on only certain three-dimensional works – seem already to be
too narrow to capture the richness of  inhabitance-as-play. Furthermore, a recent Swedish
decision, having adopted the three-step test from Article 5(5) of  the Infosoc Directive,93
provided a very narrow reading of  Sweden’s public placement exception.94 In excluding
most works, including two-dimensional artistic works, the inhabitant of  the city
encountering works is not given the means to interact with these works legally.
Third, s 62, while narrow in the types of  works it covers (so that any reproduction
does not produce a competing work), is overly broad in the sense of  providing a defence
for infringement, including, it would seem, where the work has been reproduced for
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commercial purposes.95 At this point the argument for an all-encompassing public
placement exception seems to unjustifiably ignore authors who (certainly in the case of
local street artists and graffiti writers) will also be inhabitants of  the city and therefore will
have an equally valid right-to-the-city claim.
A reformulated s 62 would need to be improved in a number of  ways. The primary
way to do so would be to allow, for example, the reproduction of  any publicly placed
works, but to disallow their commercial reproduction. Yet this would pose its own
challenges and, so, at least we might also expect that the moral right of  integrity ought to
apply to publicly placed works.96 Any adoption of  a new public placement exception that
takes seriously the extent to which the viewing of  such works is a necessary feature of
inhabitance must recognise the countervailing expectations that, at least, the right of
attribution is respected. Of  course, this would bring with it its own host of  problems, not
least that works of  publicly placed art do not usually come with neat explanations
attached that give information, such as that of  the name of  the author and other
biographical details. An alternative might be to provide in short form identifying placement
information, providing basic detail of  when and where a photograph was taken. But then,
in relation to the kinds of  interactions described in part 1, especially reproduction and
sharing of  the recording and reproduction of  the space itself, this would not necessarily
be problematic. Indeed, it would serve to accurately record the space and time of  an
inhabitant’s interaction with a publicly placed work.97
Finally, there is a lack of  clarity over the meaning of  ‘permanently situated’ in s 62.98
How is an inhabitant to know that any publicly placed work is permanent? To the
inhabitant taking photographs and the like it may not be at all obvious from simply
looking at a work whether its status is permanent or temporary.99 A work of  architecture
might be the exception here – that it is indeed permanently situated in the place where
the would-be photographer has encountered it.100 The requirement of  permanence in any
event makes little sense in the context of  an argument that the viewing of  any publicly
placed work is an ordinary part of  being in the city. In summary, s 62 does not help to
ameliorate the concerns identified above regarding the free and full circulation of  a city’s
inhabitants in public space and, consequently, the sharing of  artistic works as a means of
participating (legally) in the development of  creativity and culture within the intellectual
commons.
REORIENTATION: QUOTING THE STREET
The preceding section has identified a number of  difficulties and uncertainties in the
adoption of  a public placement exception. The discussion here considers whether the
recently enacted fair dealing exception for quotation in the UK might serve as an
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alternative route for protecting certain uses of  publicly placed artistic works. However, it
is worth noting at the outset that a specific public placement exception that deals directly
with the infringement of  copyright in publicly placed works is to be preferred over the
possibility of  making out a fair dealing defence to copyright infringement. The
inhabitance of  the city makes the viewing of  publicly placed works unavoidable and
interaction a part of  a claim to the right to the city, as well as the development of  culture
within the intellectual commons. Therefore, the potential to argue after the fact that a use
was ‘fair’ – is walking down the street and seeking to interact with a work for no other
reason than your inhabitance of  the city ‘fair’? – does not address the point that
inhabiting the city may be, as is the case with the flâneuse, entirely aimless. We could argue
that we need an open defence such as US-style fair use, but even the adoption of  such a
defence would not, unless courts were so inclined, lead to the acknowledgment of  public
placement as a factor in determining a use to be fair.101
However, if  we consider re-orienting UK copyright law towards including space as a
relevant criterion in addressing copyright infringement,102 we find a good candidate, if
not for incorporating space as a criterion, at least for a potentially less constrained
understanding of  purpose, in the s 30(1ZA) CDPA exception for quotation. The
exception applies to ‘the use of  a quotation from the work (whether for criticism or
review or otherwise)’. Yet, even accounting for the welcome breadth of  the word
‘otherwise’, the scope of  the defence is limited to situations where:
(a) the work has been made available to the public,
(b) the use of  the quotation is fair dealing with the work,
(c) the extent of  the quotation is no more than is required by the specific purpose for which
it is used, and
(d) the quotation is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement (unless this would be
impossible for reasons of  practicality or otherwise).103
A number of  issues are raised by these factors in the context of  publicly placed artistic
works and are briefly discussed here.
Although not necessarily what we might immediately think of  in the context of  the
phrase ‘making available’,104 a work displayed in public space may, with some certainty, be
said to have been ‘made available to the public’. The bigger problem for us in seeking to
interpret the quotation exception in a manner consistent with the right to the city is in
identifying whether it covers the quotation of  an entire work.105 Unless it does, it will be
of  little use to the inhabitant seeking to take a photograph, for example, of  a sculpture
or, indeed, a streetscape with a number of  copyright-protected works in the frame.
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101  See e.g. the approach in Gaylord v United States 595 F3d 1364 (2010) where a fair use defence was not made out
with respect to the reproduction, for commercial purposes, of  a publicly placed work.
102  In fact, space as a relevant aspect of  the process of  creating works ought also to be taken seriously in
determining subsistence.
103  CDPA, s 30(1ZA).
104  This difficulty tends to come up in the context of  the scope of  infringement by communication to the public
on the internet.
105  Bently and Sherman suggest that it might well be ‘fair’ to take a whole work for the purpose of  quoting it:
Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 240. In its
guidance to artists the UK IPO suggests that the reproduction of  a photograph may ‘in exceptional
circumstances’ constitute a fair dealing for quotation: IPO, Exceptions to Copyright: Guidance for Creators and
Copyright Owners October 2014 <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
448274/Exceptions_to_copyright_-_Guidance_for_creators_and_copyright_owners.pdf> 7.
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Particular problems would be raised in having to demonstrate that wholesale
quotation was fair (in accordance with subsection (b)) and that the extent taken is
necessary for a ‘specific purpose’ (per sub-s (c)). The UK Intellectual Property Office
(IPO) suggests that a quotation is allowed only where it is ‘genuinely for the purpose of
quotation’, giving the example of  a quotation in academic work.106 Yet, while it might
seem far-fetched, there does not really seem to be a reason why photographing the street
is not a ‘specific purpose’ (e.g. to record the streetscape, or to incorporate its elements in
a different work altogether), but play is perhaps not the kind of  purpose the IPO has, or
a court would have, in mind. The problem with quotation, as with the other exceptions,
lies again in the potential narrowness of  its interpretation.107
A further problem with the usefulness of  the quotation defence as a potential
replacement for a dedicated public placement defence similar to s 62 is that the act of
quotation presupposes that the quotation itself  is for an audience – such as citation within
an academic work – whereas an inhabitant may well choose to simply take a photograph
of  a street and keep it for themselves.108 Both documenting and sharing the
documentation of  a space might be considered crucial to the experience of  that space,
whereas the quotation exception would seem more readily to embrace sharing but not
mere documentation. In the latter scenario then, the reproduction of  a publicly placed
work would have been covered by the now quashed private copying exception.109 That
exception would have been perhaps the most obviously useful in protecting the individual
who wishes simply to record their experience. Ultimately, the copyright defences prove to
be unsatisfactory here from the perspective of  the individual seeking a lawful means of
interacting with publicly placed works.
Finally, there is the problem of  the nature of  ‘sufficient acknowledgement’ which may,
in the case of  publicly placed works, be almost impossible to discern (unless there is a
plaque and, for works placed in public without permission, there will not be). While
s 30(1ZA) CDPA notes that this might not be possible, the inclusion of  relevant
information, such as the place where the artistic work was encountered, may go some way
to providing an acknowledgment of  the work’s place, if  not of  its author. This brings us
back again to inhabitance as a crucial part of  making a claim to the right to the city. The
nature of  the kinds of  interactions we considered in the first part of  this article are non-
commercial; they are either for the recording of  personal, private experience or purely
communicative in communicating a work or incorporating the work in a new work and
communicating that (and so enriching the intellectual commons). The question remains,
however, whether this constitutes a conflict with how the owner of  a copyright work
might seek to exploit it.
The discussion above suggests that a copyright sensitive to an inhabitant claiming the
right to the city would produce a functioning public placement exception. Such an
exception would allow inhabitants to reproduce and disseminate images of  publicly
placed works as one part of  recording and sharing their ‘lived experience’ of  the city.
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106  IPO (n 105) 7.
107  As has been argued in relation to a failure to take into account ‘community interests’ in copyright law: Helena
R Howe, ‘Copyright Limitations and the Stewardship Model of  Property’ (2011) 2 Intellectual Property
Quarterly 183–214, 196–7. 
108  I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue.
109  CDPA, s 28B (repealed). BASCA v Secretary of  State for Business [2015] EWHC 1723 (Admin). It is worth noting
that the section likely would not have applied in all cases of  reproduction seeing as certain reproductions of
publicly placed works may be infringing (e.g. infringing an underlying drawing of  a publicly placed sculpture,
for example). The section did not apply to a personal copy that was ‘an infringing copy’: CDPA, s 28B(2)(b).
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First, it would enable the recording of  works as placed, ensuring that they remain within
the intellectual commons even after they are no longer accessible in public space. The
continued recording (reproduction) and dissemination of  publicly placed works enables
the flow of  information about the city as it has been and as it is. Second, this would also
help to preserve the image of  public spaces as they undergo change. As the discussion
above has indicated, an artistic work is unlikely to have one location given its
reproduction on social media, for example. As works are removed from the physical
commons or destroyed,110 the reproduction of  the work remains within the intellectual
commons. There, the work has the capacity both to act as a record of  a certain space as
well as to be used as part of  the creative processes of  others (and so enriching the
intellectual commons).
Conclusion
As it stands, copyright law is an inadequate means of  encouraging the development of
creativity and culture as it relates to publicly placed works. This article has sought to
explain the intuitive response to the reproduction and sharing of  publicly placed works –
that, for example, photography should be allowed – by interpreting these acts as one
element of  a claim to the right to the city. This conceptualisation of  the issue provides a
compelling reason for believing that the manner in which public placement is treated by
UK copyright law is unsatisfactory and, moreover, assists us in understanding the nature
of  the solution which is required. The appropriate starting point in determining the
acceptability of  the use of  a particular work is not the identity of  the user nor the use
that is made of  that work, but rather the question of  where the work is found. In the
public placement exception in s 62 CDPA there is a limited recognition that space and
place are relevant to the endeavour of  creativity and, in turn, to copyright, but the existing
exception fails to adequately safeguard the lawfulness of  inhabitants’ legitimate
interactions with the works they encounter. A reframing of  s 62 and other relevant
copyright exceptions in a way that is sensitive to the role of  space in the production and
promotion of  creativity and culture would be a welcome development, not least because
it would bring copyright law into harmony with unarticulated public understandings of
the appropriate scope of  copyright protection.
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110  Destruction of  graffiti writing is especially common as local authorities seek to remove all traces of  it, making
the image of  the work the only record of  its existence. We might argue that the photograph itself  becomes
the work. On the ‘photo culture’ amongst graffiti writers, for example, see Iljadica (n 99).
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